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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE BAR, 
STEPHEN TROST, 
and 
RALPH ADAMS, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 91 - 0390 
APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF IN REPLY 
TO BRIEF OF APPELLEES. 
(Priority No. 16) 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, BRIAN M. BARNARD, by and through 
counsel John Pace and Brian M. Barnard of the Utah Legal 
Clinic, submits this REPLY BRIEF in response to arguments 
raised by Appellees in their brief. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW BY APPELLEES 
BUT NOT CONSIDERED BY TRIAL COURT 
Appellees' answer in the trial court recited that Bar 
Counsel was immune from suit under Rule XVI of the 
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar. The trial 
court declined to rule on that defense. Appellees' recent 
brief suggests that this Court should consider and rule for 
the first time in this case: Whether the Utah State Bar 
Counsel is immune from any and all suits, even actions in 
1 
equity challenging their conduct and policies or the rules 
they seek to enforce. Appellees' Brief, p. 3; pp. 24-25. 
Appellant would welcome considercition of this issue and 
a determination by this Court of the unconstitutionality of 
Rule XVI of the Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State 
Bar. However, there is serious question whether that 
immunity issue i£ properly before this Court. 
FACTS 
Appellant feels compelled to respond to a repeated mis-
statement of fact by appellees. Appellees repeat that 
decisions of the Utah State Bar and its committees regarding 
discipline "are advisory only to the Supreme Court, which 
retains the inherent power to admit, discipline or disbar 
members of the Bar," and cite Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 158 
Ut.Adv.Rep. 3 (Utah 1991). Appellees' Brief, p. 8; p. 11; 
p. 17; p. 20; p. 22; p. 23. Appellees erroneously claim the 
Utah State Bar has no power to impose disciplinary sanctions 
absent approval of this Court.1 
1
 Related to Appellees' misunderstanding of the 
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar is the 
appellees' suggestion (Appellee's Brief, p. 23) that this 
Court is the real party in interest in this case. When a 
criminal statute is challenged as unconstitutional in a 
declaratory judgment action, a prosecutor, the person 
charged with prosecuting under the statute, is named 
defendant. The legislature, the government body that 
enacted the questioned statute, is not named as defendant, 
neither is the trial court that might enforce the statute. 
2 
The Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar 
provide that "The Board [of Bar Commissioners] has power to 
impose a private reprimand" upon an attorney (Rule VII (e), 
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar) without 
review or supervision by this Court. Similarly, a private 
admonition may be issued by the Utah State Bar without the 
involvement of this Court. Id., Rule VII (f). See also 
Rules IX and X, Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State 
Bar. 
This Court erred in setting forth in Barnard v. Utah 
State Bar. 158 Ut.Adv.Rep. 3 (Utah 1991) the powers of the 
Utah State Bar Board of Commissioners vis-a-vis disciplinary 
sanctions, and Appellees delight in repeating that erroneous 
information. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant in this action sought a determination as to 
whether his use of paralegals in providing information and 
assistance to his divorce clients constituted the unethical 
aiding the unauthorized practice of law. Appellees' Brief, 
p. 16. 
Appellant Barnard did not violate Rule 11 by seeking a 
declaratory judgment regarding Utah State Bar rules and the 
conduct and policies of the Utah State Bar and Bar Counsel 
in the Third Judicial District Court instead of in this 
a 
Court, The District Court has subject matter jurisdiction 
to grant the relief sought by Barnard. 
Appellant presented a justiciable case or controversy 
to the trial court and conducted reasonable pre-filing 
research and investigation regarding the applicable law. 
Moreover, despite the trial court having determined that the 
complaint did not present a case or controversy, the filing 
of this action was not so egregious as to warrant Rule 11 
sanctions. The history and purpose of Rule 11 dictate 
against the imposition of sanctions in an action where 
reasonable preparation is made before the filing, where the 
law is unclear as to jurisdiction, and where the law 
demonstrates that a viable case or controversy may exist. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BARNARD'S COMPLAINT PRESENTED A VIABLE CASE OR 
CONTROVERSY TO THE DISTRICT COURT. 
At the time Barnard sought a Declaratory Judgment in 
the Third District Court he was subject to an active 
complaint against him and an on-going investigation of his 
professional conduct. Appellees admitted that their 
investigation of plaintiff was continuing. Defendants7 
Dismissal Memorandum, 5 10, p. 6; 5 16, p. 8; Aff. of Def. 
Adams, p. 3; p. 6. Appellees had made a determination that 
4 
the charges against Barnard had some potential validity. 
Procedures of Discipline, Rule VIII (g). The second letter 
from Adams to Barnard dated January 8, 1991 specifically 
states that Adams, as Bar Counsel has initiated a complaint 
against Barnard, the first step in the Utah State Bar's 
disciplinary process. Exhibit, Aff. of Def. Adams, T.R. p. 
112; Rule VIII (a), Procedures of Discipline ("A disciplin-
ary proceeding may be initiated . . . by . . . Bar Counsel . 
. . by filing with the Bar a written complaint in ordinary, 
plain and concise language setting forth the acts or 
omissions . . .") . 
Barnard, who continued to provide pro se divorce 
information to individuals and whose practice would suffer 
injury if forced to deny help to this segment of his 
clientele, sought a Declaratory Judgment that this practice 
did not constitute assisting the unauthorized practice of 
law. Despite the clear clash of interests between the 
parties, appellees allege that Barnard's concerns and 
complaint did not present the District Court with a 
justiciable case or controversy. 
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A. BARNARD'S ACTION SEEKING TO PREVENT A WRONG 
PRESENTED A JUSTICIABLE CASE AND CONTROVERSY, 
Under a United States Supreme Court definition, an 
action to prevent a wrong presents a justiciable case or 
controversy. In defining the principles that determined 
whether a case could be properly brought under judicial 
cognizance, the United States Supreme Court in Interstate 
Commerce Commission v. Brimson determined: 
the'terms 'cases' and 'controversies' in the 
Constitution embraced the claims or contentions of 
litigants brought before the courts for adjudication by 
regular proceedings established for the protection or 
enforcement of rights, or the prevention, redress, or 
punishment of wrongs, 
154 U.S. 1047, 1057 (1894) (quotations omitted). Black's 
Law Dictionary cites that decision to define the term case 
or controversy. A case or controversy exists when a claim 
is brought to protect or enforce rights and to prevent 
wrongs. 
Principles articulated by the United States Supreme 
Court make it clear that threatened injury can be sufficient 
to present a case or controversy. In Employers Association 
of New Jersey v. State of New Jersey, 601 F.Supp. 232 
(1985), an organization of employers sued for declaratory 
and injunctive relief invalidating provisions of a state 
insurance act as preempted by federal law. The employers 
were concerned that they would be affected by a future 
increase in insurance premiums. Id. at 237. Determining 
6 
the employers had standing and that the case was ripe for 
adjudication the court stated, "it is also clear that 
threatened injury is sufficient for standing and that a case 
may be ripe for preventive relief without compelling 
litigants 'to await the consummation of threatened injury.7" 
Id. at 238 (citing Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State 
Energy Resources. 461 U.S. 190, 201 (1983)). 
Barnard was likewise threatened by a potential injury. 
The contingencies which lay between the Bar's allegations of 
misconduct against him and a possible disciplinary action 
against him for aiding the unauthorized practice of law were 
not unlike those in Employers Association. The court there 
was "not persuaded that the contingencies which lie between 
the present and a potential increase in premiums . . . are 
sufficient to deprive plaintiff of standing to sue or to 
make this case unripe for disposition . . .." Id. Neither 
should this Court be persuaded that the threat of punishment 
for unprofessional conduct hanging over an attorney does not 
merit declaratory action. 
The Employers Association court justly determined that 
"[t]he threatened injury is neither speculative nor remote. 
Waiting until the threat of higher premiums becomes a 
reality will add nothing to the clarity of the legal issues 
not already before this court. Nor will it add to 
plaintiffs' stake in the controversy stated herein." Id. 
7 
Barnard similarly could not have benefitted by waiting. 
Accusations of unethical conduct in aiding the unauthorized 
practice of law, made by the Hon. Timothy Hanson and Bar 
Counsel, hovering over Barnard's practice warranted 
expedient judicial disposition.2 
Barnard sought pre-emption; thus, the argument against 
justiciability based on the then existing factual issues is 
a weak one. Indeed, "where the merits of the case involve 
the predominantly legal question of pre-emption, to the 
extent that prudential concerns of constitutional 
adjudication are implicated, a trial on the factual issues 
which underlie justiciability would be senseless." Icl. In 
other words, since Barnard was seeking a declaration that 
his conduct was not the unethical aiding of the unauthorized 
practice of law before the Bar declared that it was so, the 
only relevant factual issue regarding justiciability was 
that the threat of accusation existed and he was seeking to 
prevent such injury. 
2
 To date, no further action against Barnard by Bar 
Counsel has been taken. Now, more than one and one/half 
years after Judge Hanson's expressed concern and Ralph 
Adams' first letter of accusation, Barnard is still in limbo 
as to whether his use of paralegals in assisting divorce 
clients constitutes aiding the unauthorized practice of law. 
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B. BARNARD'S COMPLAINT SEEKING DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST THE UTAH STATE BAR AND BAR COUNSEL PRESENTED A 
JUSTICIABLE CASE AND CONTROVERSY AND DID NOT SEEK AN 
ADVISORY OPINION, 
A controversy of sufficient immediacy existed between 
Barnard and the Utah State Bar and Bar Counsel to warrant 
the issuance of a declaratory judgment. They had adverse 
legal interests in that Barnard wished to have the trial 
court determine that his conduct was not aiding the 
unauthorized practice of law while the Bar demanded that 
Barnard respond to its complaint that his conduct was aiding 
the unauthorized practice of law. 
Appellees7 argument that the case was not yet ready for 
judicial determination is in error. The general principles 
on the issue of case or controversy as applied to 
declaratory judgments instruct that: 
The difference between an abstract question and a 
"controversy11 contemplated by the Declaratory Judgment 
Act is necessarily one of degree, and it would be 
difficult, if it would be possible, to fashion a 
precise test for determining in every case whether 
there is such a controversy. Basically, the question 
in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all 
the circumstances, show that there is a substantial 
controversy, between parties having adverse legal 
interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to 
warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment. 
Societe de Conditionnement v. Hunter Engineering, 655 F.2d 
938, 942 (9th Cir.) (1981) (quoting Maryland Casualty Co. v. 
Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)). See also 
9 
Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union, 442 U.S. 289, 
297 (1979). 
Keeping in mind that fl[t]he difference between an 
abstract question and a 'case or controversy' is necessarily 
one of degree . . . and is not discernible by any precise 
test," Babbitt at 297, this court should consider the 
purposes of a declaratory remedy. The Utah Declaratory 
Judgment Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1 et seq (1953 as 
amended), is similar in language and intent to the Federal 
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201. In discussing 
the Federal Act, the court in State Farm Fire and Casualty 
Co. v. Taylor stated: 
The purpose of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act is 
remedial and procedural . . . One of its purposes is 
to provide a remedy in situations in which an actual 
dispute exists over the rights and obligations of 
parties even though the controversy has not yet matured 
to a point where a coercive remedy is available. . . . 
[I]n determining whether to entertain a declaratory 
action, a court should consider whether a useful 
practical purpose will be served thereby; in other 
words, does the declaratory plaintiff need the remedy. 
. . . A declaration of rights and obligations is 
useful if it prevents the accrual of damages. 
Additionally, a declaration may be useful if it 
relieves a party from acting at his peril while 
uncertain of his legal rights because another party is 
yet to bring a coercive action. 
118 F.R.D. 426, 429 (M.D.N.C. 1988) (citations omitted). In 
the present case all these purposes of declaratory relief 
are served. A coercive action has not yet been brought 
against Appellant, yet he was asked to respond to 
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allegations that he is aiding the unauthorized practice of 
law. Appellant provides information to individuals 
regarding pro se divorces as part of his practice and uses 
paralegals in doing so. If such practice is indeed the 
unauthorized practice of law, then a declaratory action 
would resolve a dispute and prevent harm. A declaratory 
action would relieve Barnard from "acting at his peril while 
uncertain of his legal rights because another party is yet 
to bring a coercive action." 
C. BARNARD HAD A RIGHT TO SEEK A DECLARATORY REMEDY TO 
PREVENT FUTURE HARM. 
Barnard had a right to prevent the possible accrual of 
damages. In discussing the purposes of the declaratory 
remedy, the court in Societe quoted: 
The Declaratory Judgment Act was designed to relieve 
potential defendants from the Damoclean threat of 
impending litigation which a harassing adversary might 
brandish, while initiating suit at his leisure—or 
never. 
Societe at 943 (quoting Japan Gas Lighter Assoc, v. Ronson 
Corp.. 257 F.Supp. 219, 237 (D.N.J. 1966)). Invocation of a 
declaratory remedy in effect "brings to the present a 
litigable controversy, which otherwise might only by [sic] 
tried in the future." Societe at 943. 
The purpose of the Utah Declaratory Judgment Act, Ut. 
Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1 et seq (1953 as amended), is to protect 
parties from the harm the enforcement of a questionable law 
11 
might cause. In Utah Restaurants Assoc, v. Davis City Board 
of Health, this Court stated that the Utah Declaratory 
Judgment Act "should be construed to fulfill the original 
purpose of subjecting laws to judicial scrutiny before 
enforcement against affected citizens." 709 P.2d 1159, 1162 
(Utah 1985). This court explained that the word "laws" has 
to be construed broadly so as to encompass "challenges of 
administrative agency rules by actions for declaratory 
judgment." Id. In the present case, there is a "law," an 
ethical proscription, against assisting the unauthorized 
practice of law. Mr. Barnard received two (2) letters from 
the Utah State Bar; one alleged that Mr. Barnard7s conduct 
was a violation of Rule 5.5(b) of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, and the other informed Mr. Barnard that the Bar 
Counsel had initiated a complaint based upon his use of 
paralegals. 
Mr. Barnard has standing to seek a declaratory action 
determining whether his method of providing pro se divorce 
information is indeed unethical. This Court articulates the 
standard that a plaintiff "must be able to show that he has 
suffered some distinct and palpable injury that gives him a 
personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute." Id. 
(citations omitted). Because providing divorce information 
is part of how Mr. Barnard makes his living, an allegation 
that by doing such he has violated a Rule of Professional 
12 
Conduct and the initiation of a complaint against him by the 
Bar Counsel confers standing upon him. Barnard's "rights, 
status or other legal relations are affected." Ut. Code 
Ann. § 78-33-2 (1953 as amended). Because Mr. Barnard has 
been providing such information to the public for many years 
through paralegals, he has a strong "personal stake in the 
outcome" of this legal dispute. Utah Restaurant at 1162. 
Furthermore, given Mr. Barnard's long practice, the 
State Bar's only recent action in taking steps against him 
lends support for a declaratory action. As stated in State 
Farm, "[a] useful purpose may be served [by a declaratory 
action] if the party entitled to bring a coercive action 
fails or delays in bringing it. . . . [and] if it relieves a 
party from acting at his peril while uncertain of his legal 
rights because another party is yet to bring a coercive 
action." State Farm at 429. 
Therefore, Mr. Barnard presents a justiciable 
controversy in which he brings a claim "before the courts 
for adjudication by regular proceedings established for the 
protection or enforcement of rights, or the prevention, 
redress, or punishment of wrongs" as defined by the United 
States Supreme Court. Also, Mr. Barnard seeks a declaration 
of his rights and obligations because he needs immediate 
remedy to prevent injury, a disciplinary action against him. 
Appellees suggest that Barnard must wait until he "had been 
13 
disciplined or had been forced to halt his practice" 
(Appellees' Brief, p. 22) before he could bring a 
declaratory judgment action. If that suggestion is correct, 
and is upheld by this Court, it would mean the judicial 
repeal of the Declaratory Judgment Act. Resolving disputes 
prior to injury is a specific aim of the Declaratory 
Judgment Act. 
The limitations on the availability of a declaratory 
remedy are distinguishable. For example, in State Farm, the 
Court states, ,fa court may be induced to deny declaratory 
relief if the judgment sought would not settle the 
controversy between the parties." Id. at 429. In the 
present case, a declaration that providing divorce 
information through attorney supervised paralegals is not 
the unauthorized practice of law would easily and clearly 
settle the controversy between Barnard and the State Bar. 
Mr. Barnard's suit for declaratory action presents a 
justiciable controversy ripe for adjudication. Defendant 
argues that Mr. Barnard's suit seeks merely an advisory 
opinion from the Court. However, "[t]he difference between 
an abstract question calling for an advisory opinion and a 
ripe 'case or controversy' is one of degree, not discernible 
by any precise test." Wisconsin's Environmental Decade v. 
State Bar of Wisconsin, 747 F.2d 407, 410 (1984) (citing 
Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union, 442 U.S. 289, 
14 
297 (1979)). The issue involves whether there is a 
substantial controversy between parties with adverse legal 
interests. Environmental Decade at 411 (citations omitted). 
In this case, Judge Timothy Hanson and Bar Counsel alleged 
that Mr. Barnard is aiding the unauthorized practice of law 
while Mr. Barnard asserts that he is engaging only in the 
authorized practice by use of paralegals. Providing 
information through supervised paralegals is part of Mr. 
Barnard's long time practice. Thus, the parties have 
adverse legal interests, and Mr. Barnard should not be 
required to wait, possibly at his peril, while Bar Counsel 
decides whether to take coercive action. 
POINT II 
MEMBERS OF THE DISCIPLINARY STAFF OF THE UTAH 
STATE BAR ARE NOT IMMUNE FROM SUITS IN EQUITY. 
Appellees suggest that they are personally immune from 
suit of any kind according to Rule XVI of the Procedures of 
Discipline of the Utah State Bar. Mr. Barnard submits that 
this provision is unconstitutional under the due process 
protections of the Utah and United States Constitutions as 
well as under the Open Courts Clause, Art. I, § 11 of the 
Utah Constitution. Although Rule XVI on its face provides 
immunity from all suits whether at law or in equity for Bar 
Counsel, such a provision is constitutionally untenable. 
Whether in district court or before this Court, Bar Counsel 
15 
must be answerable in equity and subject to the controlling 
powers of a court especially in a case such as this seeking 
only declaratory and injunctive relief. Appellant would 
suggest that the intent of Rule XVI is that Bar Counsel is 
immune from any claim for damages. Such a provision would 
be appropriate and constitutional in light of the quasi-
judicial functions of Bar Counsel. However, Bar Counsel 
cannot be above the law in equity. 
The claim of total immunity under Rule XVI was not 
ruled upon by Judge Moffat in the trial court. Thus, the 
issue of immunity is not properly before this Court. 
POINT III 
THE APPEAL IN BARNARD V, SUTLIFF 
IS IRRELEVANT. 
Appellees incorrectly argue that even if this case did 
present a case or controversy, declaratory relief would have 
been inappropriate. Appellees cite McCrae & DeLand v. 
Feltch, 669 P.2d 404 (Utah 1983) in support of that claim. 
That case i£ inapposite to issues in the case at bar. 
McCrae sought a declaratory judgment in a separate and new 
action when a pending criminal action could have served as 
the appropriate vehicle for a ruling on the issue raised in 
16 
the declaratory judgment suit. There has been no filing of 
such parallel actions in this case.3 
Appellees erroneously state that "the issue Barnard 
sought to present in this case, that is, whether the 
District Court shares this Court's jurisdiction to regulate 
the practice of law, was presently the subject of an appeal 
in the Barnard v. Sutliff suit." Appellees' Brief, p. 23. 
The issue Barnard presented in this case was whether his 
conduct in providing pro se divorce information through 
paralegals was aiding the unauthorized practice of law. 
Appellees' Brief, p. 16. Defendants/Appellees argued that 
the District Court has no jurisdiction. The anticipated 
ruling from this Court in Barnard v. Sutliff will not 
resolve the question as to the propriety of Barnard's use of 
paralegals, although the ruling in Sutliff may be relevant 
to appellees' defense herein of lack of jurisdiction.4 
3
 Appellees might have a valid argument under McCrae. 
if a formal disciplinary action was in progress before the 
Utah State Bar. Appellees could then argue, Barnard should 
resolve the question of what is or isn't "the unauthorized 
practice of law" in the disciplinary proceeding. However, 
as appellees have not so succinctly told us, there is no 
formal disciplinary action pending against Barnard. 
4
 Worthy of note, appellant sought a stay in this 
case, opposed by appellees, to await a decision by this 
Court in Barnard v. Sutliff. 
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POINT IV 
RULE 11 SANCTIONS WERE INAPPROPRIATE. 
The motion for Rule 11 sanctions was unfounded and 
should have been denied. There is no clear law that the 
District Court lacks jurisdiction to hear litigation 
involving the Utah State Bar and Bar Counsel or seeking 
declaratory judgments as to Utah State Bar rules. Barnard 
presented a justiciable case and controversy to the trial 
court. Even if the action brought before the trial court 
did not presented a case or controversy, such did not 
warrant the imposition of sanctions. By imposing sanctions 
in this action seeking equitable relief from present and 
threatened future harm the trial court abused its 
discretion. 
A. IT WAS REASONABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES FOR 
MR. BARNARD TO SEEK RELIEF. 
It was reasonable for Mr. Barnard to pursue his claim. 
In Avionic Company v. General Dynamics Corp., the Court 
stated, "[w]hen reviewing a motion for sanctions pursuant to 
Rule 11, this Court must determine whether the party's 
conduct was reasonable under the circumstances." 133 F.R.D. 
36, 37 (E.D.Mo. 1990). Given that the State Bar accused him 
of unethical conduct, initiated a complaint and disciplinary 
proceeding and was investigating his alleged aiding the 
unauthorized practice of law, Mr. Barnard was undeniably 
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hampered in his legal practice• Seeking a declaratory 
judgment to determine his rights and obligations to prevent 
wrongs by his continued practice is reasonable and 
legitimate. 
B. MR. BARNARD CONDUCTED A REASONABLE AND ADEQUATE PRE-
FILING INVESTIGATION AS REQUIRED BY RULE 11. 
Pursuant to the Rule 11 requirement that a party make a 
reasonable inquiry into the status of the law upon which an 
action is based, Mr. Barnard conducted a reasonable 
investigation before filing his complaint. His pre-filing 
preparation included an examination of the law regarding the 
jurisdiction of the District Court. Mr. Barnard relied, in 
part, upon prior rulings of three (3) judges of the Salt 
Lake County Third Judicial District Court (Judges Rigtrup, 
Sawaya and Wilkinson) in which they exercised jurisdiction 
over the Bar's agents, actions and policies. Neerinas v. 
Utah State Bar, 166 Ut.Adv.Rep. 13, 817 P.2d 320 (Utah 
1991); Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 158 Ut.Adv.Rep. 3, 804 
P.2d 526 (Utah 1991); and, Barnard v. Utah State Bar, Case 
No. C-80-6127 discussed at pp. 16-17 of Appellant's Brief. 
C. MR. BARNARD'S COMPLAINT PRESENTED A JUSTICIABLE CASE 
AND CONTROVERSY TO THE COURT. 
Under the principles established by the United States 
Supreme Court and discussed above, Barnard's complaint 
seeking to prevent harm presented a case or controversy. He 
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acted under the threat of injury from an accusation of 
unprofessional conduct, Barnard sought a declaration 
against the State Bar that providing divorce information 
through supervised paralegals is not aiding the unauthorized 
practice of law. 
The United States Supreme Court has expressly mandated 
that persons in the position of Mr. Barnard should not have 
flto await the consummation of threatened injury." Pacific 
Gas & Electric Co., 461 U.S. at 201. Indeed, "it is * . . 
clear that threatened injury is sufficient for standing and 
that a case may be ripe for preventive relief," without 
making the complainant wait at his peril. Id. 
This is a viable case and controversy seeking equitable 
relief against a party with adverse legal interests. As 
established previously, the difference between an advisory 
opinion and a ripe case or controversy is one of degree and 
is not discernible by any precise test. On a spectrum this 
case lies closer to a "case and controversy" than a "mere 
abstract question". The case law supports this position. 
The principles enunciated above demonstrate that threatened 
injury is more than just arguably sufficient to state viable 
case and controversy. Therefore, the imposition of Rule 11 
sanctions for the seeking of prevention of injury and a 
determination of rights was erroneous. 
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D. IF DOUBTS EXIST REGARDING THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS 
THEY SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF BARNARD. 
In considering a motion for Rule 11 sanctions, any 
doubts must be resolved in favor of Mr. Barnard. Edwards v. 
Hare. 682 F.Supp. 1528, 1535 (D.Utah 1988). One of the 
reasons for this assumption is that Rule 11 sanctions are 
not meant to "chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity 
in pursuing factual or legal theories." Id. (citing 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 Advisory Committee Note)„ Therefore, if any 
doubts remain after consideration of the ambiguity of the 
law regarding jurisdiction over the Bar, the supporting 
United States Supreme Court case law regarding threatened 
injury and the case or controversy requirements, and the 
good faith policy reasons why a declaratory remedy may have 
been warranted, Barnard should be afforded their benefit. 
Finally, a court should be careful in judging an 
attorney's action with the benefit of hindsight. In Eastway 
Construction Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F.Supp. 558 
(E.D.N.Y. 1986), the court stated, "[i]f an attorney makes a 
reasonable investigation under the circumstances and 
concludes based on that investigation that the pleading is 
well grounded in law and fact, he cannot be sanctioned for 
filing the pleading when time and discovery prove that the 
plaintiff does not in fact have a viable claim." 
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"The difference between an abstract question calling 
for an [impermissible] advisory opinion and a ripe 'case or 
controversy' is one of degree, not discernible by any 
precise test." Wisconsin's Environmental Decade v, State 
Bar of Wisconsin. 747 F.2d 407, 410 (1984) (citing Babbitt 
v. United Farm Workers National Union, 442 U.S. 289, 297 
(1979)). The existence of a case or controversy being a 
"matter of degree" and the determination being a very fact 
specific inquiry, the routine imposition of Rule 11 
sanctions for lack of a case or controversy is questionable. 
Only if there was no reasonable arguable possibility that a 
case or controversy existed, should Rule 11 sanctions be 
imposed. 
Appellees repeat in their Brief "the Bar was only in 
the initial stages of its investigation and had made no 
determination . . . about whether Barnard's conduct was 
appropriate . . . " Appellees' Brief, p. 9; p. 10; p. 14; p. 
15; p. 18; p. 25. Thus, appellees suggest that some where, 
maybe just beyond the initial stage of the investigation, or 
maybe at step three of the investigation, there would have 
been a case or controversy appropriate for the trial court 
to consider. This emphasizes the varying degrees involved, 
as a finder of fact moves across a spectrum, to determine if 
there is a case or controversy.. 
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The mere fact that Judge Moffat found there to be no 
case or controversy, is not sufficient to warrant sanctions. 
Only if no reasonable lawyer could, with a straight face, 
argue that a case or controversy was present would Rule 11 
sanctions be appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
Whether a District Court has jurisdiction over Bar 
Counsel and jurisdiction to resolve questions as to the 
rules of the Utah State Bar is an issue yet to be determined 
by this Court. The lack of jurisdiction, if that there be, 
is not so obvious as to warrant sanctions against 
appellant. 
Whether appellant presented to the trial court a viable 
"case or controversy" is, at worst, a close call. Such a 
determination is a very factual specific examination and 
requires the consideration of "matters of degrees." The 
lack of a case or controversy, if that there be, is not so 
obvious as to warrant the impositions of sanctions against 
appellant in this matter. 
The imposition of sanctions against appellant by the 
trial court was an error of law and an abuse of discretion. 
This Court should reverse the dismissal of appellant's 
complaint, determining that the District Court had 
jurisdiction to hear this matter and that appellant 
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presented a case or controversy; this Court should reverse 
the finding of a violation of Rule 11, Ut.ReCiv.Pro. and 
vacate the sanctions in the form of the judgment against 
appellant for attorney fees; and, this Court should remand 
this case for further proceedings in the trial court. 
DATED this 15th day of JUNE, 1992. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Appellant/ 
Plaintiff 
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